Big problems

Big problems or cases are named in honor of the USA philosopher Edmund Gettier, who analyzed them in 1964. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are finally or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a dramatic impact, as epistemologists began trying to ascertain afresh what knowledge is, with almost all agreeing that Gettier had refuted the traditional definition of knowledge. They have made many attempts to repair or alternative that traditional means of knowledge, resulting in several new conceptions of knowledge and of justificatory support. In this respect, Gettier sparked a period of pronounced epistemological energy and innovation — all with a single two-and-a-half page article.

No insight into Brown’s place guides Smith in any of this reasoning. He realizes that he has good evidence for the first disjunct in each of those three disjunctions, and he sees this evidence as thereby supporting each disjunction as a whole. Seemingly, he is right about that. However, in fact one of the three disjunctions is true. The second disjunction is true because, as lucky would have it, Brown is in Barcelona — even though, as bad luck would have it, Jones does not own a Ford.  Accordingly, Smith’s belief that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is true. And there is good evidence supporting — justifying — it. But is it knowledge?
In none of those cases, say almost all epistemologists, is the belief in question knowledge.